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With this latest pronouncement and most liberal approach to
domicile, jurisdiction, and the recognition of foreign divorce decrees
by a common law court, the question naturally arises: "How do Civil
Code countries approach this problem?" The articles that follow by
members of the European Law Committee of the International and
Comparative Section and by Dr. Roland Huber, an attorney-at-law
of Zurich, Switzerland, give representative answers.
he was domiciled in New York when the foreign state divorce proceedings
were commenced. Strong doubt exists whether this section is constitutional
if it is attempted to be applied to decrees rendered in sister states as a denial
of full faith and credit, except where collateral attack is permitted by the state
of rendition (Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343; 68 S.C. 1087). It is also possible
that the courts will judicially construe this section as applying only to uni-
lateral divorces to avoid conflict with New York's long established policy of
extending recognition to foreign state decrees as a matter of comity.
THE UNITED KINGDOM
ARNOLD Ross*
The Rosenstiel decision validated tens of thousands of Mexican
decrees obtained by New York residents. However, would a Mexican
divorce be recognized in the United Kingdom? Would British citizens
who obtained such decrees, or foreigners who have property in the
United Kingdom, be permitted to enforce rights flowing from obtain-
ing of such decrees? Proper consideration of the question requires
examining the Mexican divorce statutes, the comparable British stat-
utes, and British public policy as expressed by its courts in the enforce-
ment of foreign divorce decrees.
Mexican Divorce Laws
Mexico, like the United States, is a'union of many states and
has a Federal District and two territories, Quintana Roo and the
northern part of lower California. Each of its 30 states, like each
of the 50 states in the United States, enacts its own divorce law and
the jurisdictional requirement varies from the easiest to comply with,
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that required by the State of Chihuahua, to that of the Federal District
where the divorce law confers jurisdiction upon the judge in the court
of conjugal domicile. Since the wife's domicile is that of the husband's,
it is the court of the husband's domicile. Habitual residence of six
months or more therein creates a presumption of compliance with
the domiciliary provision. Should desertion be the ground for divorce,
jurisdiction would vest in the court of the domicile of the deserted
spouse.
The divorce law of the State of Chihuahua, Mexico, provides
that the court may exercise jurisdiction either on the basis of residence
or submission. Article 22 thereof provides that the judge "competent
to take cognizance of a contested divorce" is the judge "of the place
of residence of the plaintiff," and, in the case of a divorce "by mutual
consent," the judge "of the residence of either of the spouses." Resi-
dence "shall be proven" by the "certificate of the Municipal Register"
of the place (Article 24). That is generally established by a certificate
from a mayor as to the entry in the "Municipal Register." Article 23
provides that judicial competance "may also be fixed" by express or
tacit submission. The voluntary appearance of the other spouse in
the foreign court by an attorney tends to give support to an acquired
jurisdiction over the marriage as a legal entity.
The Chihuahua divorce law details twenty grounds for the
granting of a decree, from mutual consent to adultery. Most of the
Mexican states grant relief on similar grounds. The only serious
difference among them concerns itself with the jurisdiction of the
courts to entertain the litigation.
The Divorce Laws of the United Kingdom
The British courts have a more conservative approach to the
question of dissolving marriages. The High Court in England has
jurisdiction of matrimonial causes, declarations of legitimacy, the
validity of marriages and matters incidental thereto in both England
and Wales.' Comparable power is vested in the Court of Session in
1The Matrimonial Causes Act, 1950 (14 Geo. 6 c. 25); Wilson v. Wilson
(1872) L.R. 2P v D.435; Le Mesurier v. Le Mesurier [1895] A.C. 517, 540
(P.C.); See Dicey's Conflict of Laws-Seventh Edition, exceptions 1 and 2
to Rule 40; Section 21 of the Supreme Court of Judicature (Consolidated) Act,
1925 (c. 49).
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Scotland 2 and the High Court in Northern Ireland I for the appli-
cable laws relating to those countries.
These courts will entertain divorce proceedings only if both
husband and wife are domiciled in their respective countries at the
commencement of the proceeding. The wife's domicile is that of
her husband.'
Under the laws of the United Kingdom, every person acquires a
domicile of origin. That is the domicile of the father.' Should the
child be illegitimate, or be born after the death of the father, it would
have the domicile of the mother. In the United Kingdom a person of
full age, except a married woman, and in Scotland a minor, may
acquire an independent domicile of choice. To establish it one must
be able to prove that he has established not only a residence in a
new country but that he intends to remain there permanently.8 This
intention distinguishes domicile under the English and Scottish law
from residence. One's personal choice, when proven, is controlling
and results in the suspension of the domicile of origin until it is aban-
doned, in which case the domicile of origin is revived.
The English Statutes
The grave hardship resulting from the wife's domicile being
that of the husband was rectified, in part, by Parliament by certain
statutory exceptions to the High Court's jurisdictional requirement
of domicile. The Matrimonial Causes Act, 1950, applicable to
England and Wales, conferred on the High Court in England jurisdic-
tion to entertain proceedings by a wife for divorce, notwithstanding
that her husband was not domiciled in England, (a) if she had been
deserted by him, or if he had been deported from the United Kingdom,
provided that he was domiciled in England immediately before the
desertion or deportation, (§ 18(1) (a)), or (b) if she was a resident
in England and resided there for a period of three years immediately
preceding the commencement of the proceedings, provided that her
2 Indian and Colonial Divorce Jurisdiction Act, 1926, s. 1(3) as amended
by the Act of 1940, s. 4(2); Le Mesurier v. Le Mesurier, supra.
8 Colonial and Other Territories (Divorce Jurisdiction) Act. 1950, s. 1.
'Report of Royal Commission on Marriage and Divorce, 1951-1955 p. 209,
pars. 792, 796.
58d.
6 Winans v. Attorney General, [1904] A.C. 287; Ramsay v. Liverpool Royal
Infirmary [1930], A.C. 588.
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husband was not domiciled in any part of the United Kingdom or in
the Channel Islands or the Isle of Man (§ 18 (1) (b)).
By Section 18(2) of that Act the court was given jurisdiction
to entertain proceedings by a wife for a decree determining that there
is a presumption of death and for the dissolution of a marriage if
she was a resident in England and had resided there for a period of
three years immediately preceding the commencement of the pro-
ceedings.
English and Scottish women who married members of the armed
forces of other countries during their stay in those countries during
World War II were granted the right to bring divorce actions by the
Matrimonial Causes (War Marriages) Act, 1944. This was limited
to marriages between September 3, 1939, and June 1, 1950, and
the action for divorce had to be brought by the latter date.
The exceptions to domicile, detailed in the Matrimonial Causes
Act, 1950, are also found in the comparable statutes applicable to
Scotland ' and Northern Ireland. 8
The provision in the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1950, that at
least three years must pass since the date of the marriage before
institution of an action for divorce, may be waived by the High Court
by its approval of an application for waiver which shows exceptional
hardship suffered by the petitioner or exceptional depravity of the
respondent. The waiver must be obtained before filing the petition
for divorce.9
That Act details as grounds for divorce (which may be sought
by either spouse) that the respondent since the celebration of the
marriage either committed adultery, deserted the petitioner without
cause for a period of at least three years immediately preceding the
presentation of the petition, has treated the petitioner with cruelty,
or is incurably of unsound mind and has been continuously under
care and treatment for a period of at least five years immediately
preceding the petition; and by the wife, on the ground that her hus-
band has, since the celebration of the marriage, been guilty of rape,
sodomy, or beastiality. 0
The Divorce (Insanity and Desertion) Act, 1958 (c.54) permits
acceptance of the certification of proof of mental incapacity from
7 Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1949, s. 2.
8 Chapter 100, Enacted by British Parliament 12/16/1949, s. 10.
9 The Matrimonial Causes Act, 1950 (c. 25) s. 2.
10 Ibid., s. 1.
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an accredited hospital which renders the type of service supplied to
mental patients by the hospitals named in the Matrimonial Causes
Act, 1950.
The courts in England and Scotland apply their respective laws
to determine the issues in all cases even where jurisdiction is not
based on domicile.
Divorce Legislation for Scotland
The Court of Session, Scotland, has jurisdiction to consider this
particular remedy. The Divorce (Scotland) Act of 1938 altered the
then existing statute concerning grounds for relief by adding four
new grounds, namely incurable insanity, cruelty, sodomy, and beas-
tiality. These, when added to the prior provisions, made the grounds
for relief in both Scotland and England very much alike.
Basis for Divorce Legislation in Northern Ireland
The British Parliament enacted in the Matrimonial Causes and
Marriage Laws of 1870 divorce legislation for Northern Ireland.,,
That body, in 1949, stated that the Parliament of Northern Ireland
had the power to enact divorce laws similar to certain sections which
the British Parliament had enacted in the Matrimonial Causes Act
of 1937. But the question as to the jurisdiction of the court where
such causes may be tried is resolved by analyzing the laws enacted to
apply to "Colonial and Other Territories."
The British Parliament in 1926 enacted the Indian and Colonial
Jurisdiction Act. This conferred jurisdiction on Indian courts to
consider divorce litigation where the parties were British subjects
domiciled in England or Scotland." That statute conferred like
jurisdiction on the courts of any of her Majesty's Dominion (other
than self-governed dominions), to which the Act was extended by
Orders in Council." The Colonial and Other Territories (Divorce
Jurisdiction) Act, 1950, extended the jurisdictional authority detailed
in the 1926 Act to the High Court of Northern Ireland and permitted
that Court to confer the self-same rights to persons domiciled in
that area.
11 Matrimonial Causes and Marriage Law (1) 33-34 V, c. 110, 1870 and
1871 (b).
12 Act of 1926, s. 1(1) (a) as amended byAct of 1940, s. 1(1).
18 They may not be extended to Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South
Africa, Newfoundland, and Southern Rhodesia. It no longer applies to India.
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Analysis of Cases
The English courts prior to 1953 held that since they had
refused to entertain a divorce action unless the parties were domiciled
in England they would not recognize a foreign decree unless the
parties were domiciled in the foreign country at the time the action
was brought." No substitute was accepted for domicile. Neither
residence nor nationality was accepted as the basis for jurisdiction. 5
In Travers v. Holley," decided that year, a different rule
emerged. There, a married couple, domiciled in England, had emi-
grated to Australia and acquired a domicile in New South Wales.
The husband deserted his wife, returned to England, and re-established
his domicile in that country. The wife sued in New South Wales and
was granted a divorce on the grounds of desertion. The Australian
Court invoked a local statute similar to the English Matrimonial
Causes Act, 1950, to grant the necessary relief. The English courts
recognized that foreign decree. The doctrine upon which the court
acted was based on notions of reciprocity and comity.
If the courts of the domicile recognized the jurisdiction of the
court of another country, a decree granted by the latter court would
be deemed valid in England. It should follow that a divorce decree
obtained in a country foreign to the domicile upon a ground that
would be insufficient by the law of the particular country or state, but
which is recognized as valid on the ground of comity or by private
international law, should be enforced in England.
That conclusion was reached in Armitage v. Attorney General."
There an English wife of an American citizen, domiciled in New
York, after residing for 90 days in South Dakota, obtained a divorce
decree in that State on the ground of desertion. The New York
divorce law, prior to the legislation in 1966 which becomes operative
on September 1, 1967, granted no such relief. The full faith and
credit provision of the United States Constitution required New York
to recognize the South Dakota decree. Sir Gorell Barnes held that
the decree was equally binding in England. His reasoning was that
since all questions of status are subject to the lex domicilii, and the
14 Harvey v. Farnie (1880), 5 P.D. 153; (1882), 8 App. Cas. 43; Bater v.
Bater [1906] P. 209; Le Mesurier v. Le Mesurier, supra; Lankester v. Lankester,
[1925] P. 114.
16 Papadopoulos v. Papadopoulous [1930], P. 55; Armitage v. Attorney Gen-
eral, [1906] P. 135, 140.
18 [1953] P. 246.
17 [1906] P. 135.
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laws of New York recognized the decree as affecting the status of the
husband and wife, the English courts should accept that conclusion.
Robinson-Scott v. Robinson-Scott,8 in 1958, by Judge Karmin-
ski, approved the reasoning of Travers and established that the test
of reciprocity is the factual position and not the jurisdictional require-
ment. The Learned Judge held that the true rule in Travers was not
that an English court would recognize a foreign divorce decree when-
ever the foreign court assumed jurisdiction in circumstances similar
to those in which an English court would assume jurisdiction but
that the facts of the case must be investigated to determine whether
reciprocity may be employed.
In Robinson-Scott the husband was domiciled in England. His
Swiss wife, domiciled under Swiss law in Switzerland, was granted a
divorce decree by the District Court of Zurich. The husband peti-
tioned the High Court for a declaration that the marriage had been
validly dissolved by the Swiss court. Judge Karminski said in part:
It is clear that, in the present case, there can be no question of the
Zurich court's exercising a jurisdiction mutatis mutandis on the same
basis as the English courts, since the jurisdiction of the Zurich court was
based on a concept of domicile wholly unrecognized by English law.' 9
The English judge recognized the decree because the wife had
been a resident in the canton of Zurich for at least three years prior
to the commencement of the Swiss action, a period of time similar
to the English requirement.
Judge Davies followed a similar approach in refusing to recog-
nize a Florida divorce in Dunne v. Sabin 20 where the wife who ob-
tained a divorce had resided in that State for two years. He said:
Where, as here, you find a court purporting, no doubt completely prop-
erly according to the laws of Florida, to exercise jurisdiction upon 90 days
residence, even though that is coupled with something that we do not
recognize, namely, a separate domicile of the wife in the United States,
the only possible answer which this court can give is to say that the decree
of the foreign court was in our law invalid.21
The rule that an English court will recognize decrees of the
court of the domicile means that it will recognize decrees .of the
country in which the parties were domiciled in the English sense.
is [1958] P. 71.
19 [1958] P. 71, 84-85.
20 [1955] P. 178.
21 [1955] P. 178, 190.
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The appropriate inquiry required is whether, on the facts, the connec-
tion as defined by English law is present. Had the wife been a resi-
dent of Florida for at least three years prior to the commencement
of the action the decree would in all likelihood have been recognized
and enforced in England because of a similar right existing in England
and available to a wife based on residence.
Commissioner Latey recognized a Norwegian divorce decree in
Manning v. Manning." There the wife, domiciled in England, had
obtained a Norwegian divorce decree based upon a period of separa-
tion. The Norwegian court assumed jurisdiction on the ground that
the last common residence of the parties had been in Norway. The
Commissioner recognized the decree because the wife, at the time
the Norway action was commenced, had been a resident in Norway
for at least three years.
A similar determination was made in Carr v. Carr" where a
Northern Irish divorce based on the husband's desertion was recog-
nized.
The grounds for the decrees in Robinson-Scott and in Manning
were unknown to English domestic law. The decrees were recognized
because the facts in those cases were similar to those upon which an
English court would entertain jurisdiction without regard to the
ground for the action. Choice of law and the content of the chosen
law are immaterial in problems of recognition.
It follows that although an Englishwoman's domicile is that
of her husband, she can take up residence for three years in any
other country which grants divorce decree on grounds unknown to
English law, return, and have the English courts recognize and enforce
the decree.
The English reaction to a Mexican decree was expressed in
Mountbatten v. Mountbatten." The husband, there, whose domicile
or origin was England, married in New York in 1950 and lived with
his wife in New York until 1952 when he returned to England. He
alleged that his wife refused to follow him. The wife, in 1954, ob-
tained a divorce decree in the State of Chihuahua in Mexico. The
Mexican court assumed jurisdiction on the ground that the wife was
a resident of Mexico, this fact being noted by her physical presence
there, and that both parties submitted to the jurisdiction. The ground
22 [1958] P. 112.
28 [1955] 1 W.L.R. 422.
24 [1959] 2 W.L.R. 128.
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for relief was incompatibility of temperament. The husband brought
a proceeding in England to have the court determine that his marriage
had been validly dissolved by the Mexican decree. The English court
accepted evidence that the Mexican decree would be recognized in
New York. The wife had returned to New York immediately after
having obtained the Mexican decree and continued to live there until
the English proceeding was undertaken.
The substance of the husband's contention was that his wife
was a resident in New York for more than three years and was subject
to the jurisdiction of its courts. If the New York courts accepted the
Mexican decree he believed that that instrument should be accepted
in England under the rule in Travers. He claimed, further, that if
the parties were domiciled in a country or state where the Mexican
decree would be recognized, it should be valid under the rule in
Armitage. Travers makes three years' residence by the wife equivalent
to domicile. And Armitage renders recognition equivalent to pro-
nouncement. The husband believed that recognition by the courts of
three years' residence by the wife should be treated in the same way
as pronouncement by that court and, therefore, as recognition by the
courts of the domicile.
Judge Davies rejected that view and refused to recognize the
validity of the Mexican divorce. He expressed doubt as to whether
at the moment of obtaining the Mexican divorce the wife retained
her New York residence. He said:
Here we have a case of a woman who quite deliberately, with the knowl-
edge and consent of her husband, left the place where she was ordinarily
resident, went abroad and obtained a certificate of resident in a foreign
country in order to give jurisdiction to the courts of that country.25
The judge expressed dissatisfaction with the breadth of the rule
in Armitage. He suggested that its operation was limited to cases in
which the reason why the courts of the domicile would recognize the
decree is that it was "pronounced by a court in the jurisdiction of
which the wife had obtained a separate domicile."
He decided that even if the wife was a resident in New York
for three years immediately preceding the commencement of the
Mexican proceedings, and accepting the wide interpretation of Armi-
tage, the divorce decree could not be recognized simply because it
would have been regarded as valid in New York. He would have
25 [1959] 2 W.L.R. 128, 150.
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ruled differently if the decree had been rendered by a New York
court.
The approach of Judge Davies is that the law of the domicile
is still paramount and that the exception which Parliament created
must be narrowly construed. He said:
. . . It is, in my judgment, impossible to hold that a decree to which
this court would not give direct recognition is owing to the interposition
of a residential qualification of the wife in a third State entitled on account
of such residential qualification to be recognized here.
The proposition advanced for the husband is that the test for recognition
is now a dual one. Is the decree valid either by the law of the domicile
or by the law of the place in which we recognize that the wife is con-
currently entitled to proceed? If the answer to either of these questions
is in the affirmative, then, it is said, the decree is entitled to recognition
here. The proposition is, in my judgment, a wholly illegitimate extension
of the principle of comity upon which the case of Travers v. Holley
and the subsequent cases turn. It is not difficult to frame an example
to illustrate the impossibility of such an extension. Suppose a husband
and wife domiciled in, say, Victoria, Australia. The wife goes off to
New York and ordinarily resides there for over three years. She then
goes to Mexico and obtains a decree there in similar circumstances to
those in which the present wife obtained her decree. That Mexican decree
is not recognized by the courts of the domicile, Victoria, but is recognized
by the courts of the wife's residence, New York. In subsequent pro-
ceedings in the English courts the validity of the Mexican decree is called
in question-for example, in proceedings as to legitimacy or inheritance
after a subsequent marriage of one of the parties. This court would be
faced with the position that the Mexican decree was not recognized by
the court of the domicile but was recognized by the court of the wife's
residence. Can it possibly be doubted that this court would hold, follow-
ing the court of the domicile, that the decree was not entitled to recognition.2 6
Judge Davies's opinion appears to run counter to the reasons
applied to recognize the foreign decree in Travers. Many of the rules
relating to the recognition of decrees by reference to domicile have
been carried into the area of decrees recognized by reference to
alternative connecting factors under Travers. The connecting factor
is interpreted according to English notions. Neither the reason why
the foreign court assumed jurisdiction nor the grounds upon which
it grants a divorce is material. If the connecting factor is not domicile,
validity on account of recognition is not equated to validity on
account of actual pronouncement.
26 [1959] 2 W.L.R. 128, 154-5.
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Conclusion
The foregoing discussion leads to the following conclusions in
determining whether a Mexican divorce decree will be recognized
and enforced in the United Kingdom. England, Scotland, Wales,
and Northern Ireland still adhere to the common law principle that
the jurisdiction of the court in divorce proceedings is based on the
domicile of the parties, and the wife's domicile is that of the husband.
The English concept of domicile is quite different from the common
understanding of the term, and, once existing, requires considerable
proof to establish a change. The sole exception to that premise for
jurisdiction is the instance of a wife being deserted and, in that event,
the court will entertain jurisdiction based on the wife's continued
residence of at least three years in the jurisdiction prior to the institu-
tion of the action. Should a foreign divorce proceeding be based on
similar jurisdictional facts the British courts, on the establishment
of such evidence, will recognize the foreign decree regardless of the
grounds upon which it was granted.
Mountbatten reduces recognition of foreign decrees based on
the premise that the decree would be recognized by the state where
the plaintiff resided, although that state would not grant a decree on
the ground obtained in the foreign court. The 1906 decision in
Armitage was rendered before the British Parliament permitted a
deserted wife to bring an action based on a residence requirement.
It is obvious from the above that a Mexican divorce decree issued
on the familiar residence requirement in the State of Chihuahua will
not be recognized in the United Kingdom, nor enforced there.
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